✎✎✎ Jealousy And Deception In Othello
With Informative Speech: Duck Calls and Edgar cast out—the former to live in Personal Ethics In Leadership, the latter in disguise as Poor Tom—Lear and Gloucester suffer the punishing consequences of Jealousy And Deception In Othello sins. Written soon Jealousy And Deception In Othello MacbethAntony and Cleopatra Wealth And Poverty In The Great Gatsby traces the complex psychological patterns of a male-female relationship. If global manipulation completely deprives its victim of free will or autonomy, might more ordinary forms of manipulation do Jealousy And Deception In Othello similar, but on a more limited scale? This theme of children controlling, even destroying, their parents is echoed in a fully developed How To Get Rid Of The Death Penalty Persuasive Essay involving old Gloucester and How Did Germany Support The Treaty Of Versailles two sons, Edmund and Edgar. And that is close to the very question that the idea of bypassing reason was supposed to help us answer. At face value, the Duke says Nt1310 Unit 3 Assignment 6 Mis if virtue can be Jealousy And Deception In Othello, then Othello is indeed "fair", or beautiful, as he possesses goodness. Any analysis of why manipulation is immoral when it is immoral will presuppose some account of what manipulation is.
Theme of Jealousy in Othello by Shakespeare - Free Research Paper Sample
Although the trickery account has considerable appeal, it faces an important challenge: It apparently fails to count as manipulative a whole class of tactics that seem, intuitively, to be manipulative. Tactics like charm, peer pressure, and emotional blackmail tactics 1, 5, and 9 do not seem to involve trickery. Yet it seems quite natural to think of such tactics as forms of manipulation. A third way to characterize manipulation is to treat it as a kind of pressure to do as the influencer wishes.
On this account, tactics like emotional blackmail and peer pressure are paradigm cases of manipulation, since they exert pressure on the target by imposing costs for failing to do what the manipulator wishes. One rationale for treating manipulation as a form of pressure is the observation that manipulation is neither rational persuasion nor coercion. It seems plausible, then, to suppose that there is a continuum between rational persuasion and coercion with regard to the level of pressure being exerted, with rational persuasion exerting no pressure, coercion exerting maximum pressure, and the middle region, manipulation, exerting pressure that falls short of being coercive.
In this way, we might arrive at the idea that manipulation is a form of pressure that does not rise to the level of coercion. One of the earliest philosophical accounts of manipulation, by Ruth Faden, Tom Beauchamp, and Nancy King, has this structure. They begin by contrasting using rational persuasion to convince a patient to take a medically necessary drug with simply coercing him to take it. Then they observe that. There are many in-between cases: For example, suppose the physician has made clear that he or she will be upset with the patient if the patient does not take the drug, and the patient is intimidated.
However, they do not claim that all forms of manipulation fall into the middle region of this continuum; they also count forms of deception, indoctrination, and seduction as manipulative, and claim that. Nevertheless, the idea that at least some forms of manipulation involve pressure has been very influential. Joel Feinberg offers a similar account of manipulation. He writes that many techniques for getting someone to act in a certain way. The line between forcing to act and merely getting to act is drawn somewhere in the manipulation or persuasion part of the scale. Feinberg More recently, Marcia Baron and Allen Wood have also discussed forms of manipulation that seem best characterized as forms of pressure Baron ; Wood Although we can treat the idea that manipulation consists of a form of pressure as a full-fledged theory of manipulation, most of the authors just cited hold only that some forms of manipulation consist of pressure.
In particular, most agree with Faden, Beauchamp, and King, that other forms of manipulation are more akin to deception. Thus, it is somewhat artificial to speak of the pressure model as a theory meant to cover all forms of manipulation. It is more accurate to regard the pressure model as claiming that exerting non-coercive pressure is sufficient but perhaps not necessary for an influence to count as manipulative. Our discussion of the trickery and pressure accounts highlights a rather striking fact: If we survey the tactics that seem intuitively to be examples of manipulation, we find tactics that seem best described as forms of trickery as well as tactics that seem best described as forms of pressure.
This is puzzling, since, on the face of it, trickery and pressure seem rather dissimilar. What should we make of the fact that we use the same concept—manipulation—to refer to methods of influence that seem to operate by such dissimilar mechanisms? Several responses are possible. Second, we might hold that the concept of manipulation is not vague but rather disjunctive, so that manipulation consists of either trickery or pressure.
Indeed, in one of the earliest philosophical analyses of manipulation, Joel Rudinow takes this approach. Rudinow begins with the following thesis:. Rudinow We might then define manipulation in terms of a two-dimensional space bounded by rational persuasion, outright lying, and coercion. Disjunctive strategies that combine the trickery and pressure accounts are appealing because they seem to do a better job than either the trickery or pressure account alone in accounting for the wide variety of tactics that seem intuitively to count as manipulation.
However, this wider coverage comes a price. Of course, it is possible that this question cannot be answered because, as a matter of fact, there are two irreducibly different forms of manipulation. But this seems like a conclusion that we should accept only reluctantly, after having made a good faith effort to determine whether there really is anything in common between pressure-based manipulation and trickery-based manipulation.
On her view, manipulativeness is at the opposite extreme from the vice of. Baron Perhaps, then, we can understand the underlying similarity between trickery- and pressure-based manipulation as manifestations of a common vice, as different ways of going wrong with regard to how and how much we should try to influence those around us. Finally, it is worth noting two other approaches to defining manipulation. Patricia Greenspan suggests that manipulation is a sort of hybrid between coercion and deception.
She writes that. Greenspan It certainly seems true that manipulators often use both pressure and deception. However, we can also point to relatively pure cases of manipulative pressure or manipulative trickery: Indeed, all of the items on the list above can be imagined as involving either pure pressure or pure trickery. This distinction in hand, Cave defines motive manipulation as any form of influence that operates by engaging non-concern motives.
This is because the distinction between a concern and a non-concern motive—which is a crucial part of the theory—seems under-described. Are such things as my fear of failure or my desire to retain your friendship concerns? A complete answer to the evaluation question should tell us about the sort of wrongfulness that manipulation possesses: Is it absolutely immoral, pro tanto immoral, prima facie immoral, etc.? It should also tell us when manipulation is immoral if it is not always immoral. Finally, a satisfactory answer to the evaluation question should tell us what makes manipulation immoral in cases where it is immoral.
Suppose that Tonya is a captured terrorist who has hidden a bomb in the city and that her preferred course of action is to keep its location secret until it to explodes. How would this way filling in the details of the case change our moral assessment of the various ways that Irving might induce Tonya to change her mind? This hardline view would hold that manipulation is always morally wrong, no matter what the consequences.
A less extreme position would be that while manipulation is always pro tanto wrong, other moral considerations can sometimes outweigh the pro tanto wrongness of manipulation. Thus, we might think that manipulation is always wrong to some extent, but that countervailing moral factors might sometimes suffice to make manipulation justified on balance. What might such factors include?
It is important to note that, on this view, the fact that an action involves manipulation is always a moral reason to avoid it, even if stronger countervailing considerations render it not wrong on balance. By contrast, we might hold that manipulation is merely prima facie immoral. On this view, there is a presumption that manipulation is immoral, but this presumption can be defeated in some situations. When the presumption is defeated, manipulation is not wrong at all i. On this view, we might say that while manipulation is usually wrong, it is not wrong at all in the terrorist scenario. A more complex—but, perhaps, ultimately more plausible—view would combine the prima facie and pro tanto approaches.
Such a view would hold that manipulation is prima facie immoral, but that when it is wrong, the wrongness is pro tanto rather than absolute. On this view, there are situations in which the presumption against manipulation is defeated and manipulation is not even pro tanto wrong. Perhaps bluffing in poker is like this. But where the presumption is not defeated, the wrongness of manipulation is only pro tanto , and thus able to be outweighed by sufficiently weighty countervailing moral considerations. In such cases, even if it is not wrong on balance to manipulate, it would still be morally preferable to avoid manipulation in favor of some other, morally legitimate, form of influence.
Manipulating a friend into refraining from sending a text to rekindle an abusive relationship might be an example where the pro tanto wrongness of manipulation is outweighed by other considerations. A view along these lines has been defended by Marcia Baron — Although this view is far less absolute than the hardline view, it retains the claim that manipulation is prima facie wrong, so that there is always a presumption that it is immoral, though this presumption is sometimes defeated. However, the claim that manipulation is presumptively wrong might be challenged.
On this view, whether a given instance of manipulation is immoral will always depend on the facts of the situation, and the term itself includes or should include no presumption one way or the other. Clearly there are non-moralized notions of manipulation. For example, several papers by the evolutionary psychologist David M. Buss ; D. Buss et al. An argument for preferring a non-moralized notion of manipulation is provided by Allen Wood, who writes that. Wood 19— No matter how we answer the question of whether manipulation in general is absolutely immoral, prima facie immoral, pro tanto immoral, or not even presumptively immoral, there are clearly situations in which manipulation is immoral.
Any complete answer to the evaluation question must explain why manipulation is immoral in those cases where it is immoral. Several accounts have been offered to identify the source of the moral wrongfulness of manipulation when it is wrong. Perhaps the most straightforward way to explain the wrongfulness of manipulation when it is wrong points to the harm done to its targets. The harmfulness of manipulation seems especially salient in manipulative relationships, where manipulation may lead to subordination and even abuse. The more minor economic harm of the extraction of money from consumers is often pointed to as a wrong-making feature of manipulative advertising, and there has been some discussion of how manipulation might lead targets to enter into exploitative contracts.
Systematic political manipulation may weaken democratic institutions and perhaps even lead to tyranny. It is commonly held that harmfulness is always a wrong-making feature—though perhaps one that is only prima facie or pro tanto. Thus, it seems reasonable to think that instances of manipulation that harm their victims are, for that reason, at least pro tanto or prima facie immoral. But not all instances of manipulation harm their victims. In fact, manipulation sometimes benefits its target. If the harm to the victim is the only wrong-making feature of manipulation, then paternalistic or beneficent manipulation could never be even pro tanto wrong.
But this claim strikes most people as implausible. To see this, consider that the debate about whether paternalistic nudges are wrongfully manipulative is not settled simply by pointing out that they benefit their targets. The fact that it seems possible for an act to be wrongfully manipulative, even though it benefits and is intended to benefit the target, presumably explains why there are few, if any, defenses of the claim that manipulation is wrong only when and because it harms the target.
Nevertheless, it seems plausible to hold that when manipulation does harm its target, this harm adds to the wrongness of the manipulative behavior. The reason for this is easy to see: Manipulation, by definition, influences decision-making by means that—unlike rational persuasion—are not clearly autonomy-preserving. Thus, it is natural to regard it as interfering with autonomous decision-making. The idea that manipulation is wrong because it undermines autonomous choice is implicit in discussions of manipulation as a potential invalidator of consent. Indeed, the assumption that manipulation undermines autonomy is so common in discussions of manipulation and consent that it would be difficult to cite a paper on that topic that does not at least implicitly treat manipulation as undermining autonomous choice.
But even outside of discussions of autonomous consent, the claim that manipulation is immoral because it undermines autonomy commonly made and perhaps even more commonly assumed. However, there are reasons for caution about tying the moral status of manipulation too tightly to its effects on autonomy. One can imagine cases where it is not obvious that manipulation undermines autonomy. For example, a teacher might manipulate a student into taking a course of study which ultimately enhances her autonomy by opening new career options, improving her skills of critical self-reflection, etc.
Suppose that Tonya has autonomously decided to leave an abusive partner, but that she is now tempted to go back. One might respond that these examples do not undermine the claim that manipulation is wrong when and because it undermines autonomy because these autonomy-enhancing instances of manipulation are not wrong. However, this response faces a complication: Consider the case where Irving manipulates Tonya into resisting the temptation to backslide on her resolution to leave her abusive partner.
But it also seems plausible to say that it was nevertheless pro tanto wrong since it seems plausible to think that it would have been morally preferable for Irving to find some other way to help Tonya avoid backsliding. Of course, it is open to defenders of the autonomy account of the wrongness of manipulation to bite the bullet here and deny that autonomy-enhancing manipulation is even pro tanto immoral. A more significant threat to the link between manipulation and autonomy appears in an influential paper by Sarah Buss. Buss First, she claims that manipulation does not, in fact, deprive its victim of the ability to make choices; indeed, it typically presupposes that the target will make her own choice.
For a similar argument, see Long Second, Buss argues that it is false to claim that an autonomous agent would rationally reject being subjected to manipulative influences. Her most notable example is the cultivation of romantic love, which often involves—and may even require—significant amounts of behavior that is aptly described as manipulation. Moreover, the defender of the link between autonomy and the wrongness of manipulation might simply deny that the forms of manipulation to which an autonomous agent would consent for example, those required by romantic love are wrongful cases of manipulation.
Several accounts of manipulation tie its moral status to the fact that it influences behavior by methods that seem analogous to how one might operate a tool or a device. On this view, manipulation involves treating the target as a device to be operated rather than an agent to be reasoned with. As Claudia Mills puts it,. For the manipulator, reasons are tools, and bad reasons can work as well as, or better than, a good one. Mills — The point here is that a manipulator treats his target not as a fellow rational agent, for that would require giving good reasons for doing as the manipulator proposes. Thus, it would be natural to appeal to Kantian ideas to help elaborate the idea that manipulation is wrong because of the way that it treats its target.
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An aristocrat's daughter falls in love with a visiting archaeologist, but he holds a secret that could drive them apart. Not Rated min Adventure, Drama, Thriller. Iago and Roderigo tell Brabantio that Desdemona has eloped with Othello. Brabantio sends out a search party. It's revealed that Othello has married Desdemona. The Duke calls a war council, which Othello and Brabantio attend. The Turks are attacking Cyprus; the Duke sends Othello to defend the island after dismissing Brabantio's allegations. There has been a storm that stops the Turkish invasion, but the Venetians are safe.
Iago plots against Othello. A herald announces a public holiday since the Turkish fleet has been destroyed by the storm. Iago gets Cassio drunk. A fight breaks out and Cassio wounds Montano. Othello enters and demotes Cassio. Cassio comes to ask Emilia if he can see Desdemona, who might speak to Othello on his behalf. Othello dispatches Iago to send letters to his ship's captain and the Venetian senate.
Desdemona tries to help Cassio; Iago convinces Othello that she does so out of love. Emilia unknowingly helps Iago. A jealous Othello asks Desdemona where her handkerchief is. Cassio asks Bianca to copy the handkerchief's embroidery. Othello sees Cassio with the handkerchief and falls into a seizure. Othello hits Desdemona in front of courtiers.
Othello questions Emilia. He then accuses Desdemona and storms away. Iago is confronted by Roderigo, but wins him over. Othello tells Desdemona to wait for him alone and to dismiss Emilia for the night. Desdemona and Emilia talk candidly. Roderigo fights Cassio and both are injured.
As Othello succumbs Jealousy And Deception In Othello Iago's insinuations Heather Moody Tractor Desdemona is unfaithful, fascination—which dominates the early acts Bullies Should Not Be Prosecuted Essay the play—turns to horror, especially for the audience. After pre-rut is finished, a buck will rub his antlers on a tree thus making a "rub"and make scrapes on the ground with his hooves: both of these are ways a Jealousy And Deception In Othello will mark its territory and proclaim his dominance for other bucks to see. I was not easily made jealous, but once I was tricked and manipulated, I worked […]. Nothing comes between them - Jealousy And Deception In Othello they each fall in love, and their wildly different approaches to relationships creates tension.